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Introduction  
 The literature on opposition movements in the Arab world has focused 
traditionally on the role that they perform in challenging the incumbent regimes. As 
Albrecht (2010: 3) argues ‘opposition and contentious collective activism has almost 
exclusively been addressed by looking at the potential overthrow of incumbent 
regimes.’ Recently however, more refined analyses of opposition politics in the Arab 
world have emerged. These studies examine the way in which opposition parties and 
movements become, willingly or unwillingly, pillars of the authoritarian regime that 
they so resent. Arab regimes are able to manage the opposition more through direct 
co-optation than repression (Albrecht, 2005). The acceptance of many within the 
opposition to be co-opted stems from belief that they might in some way the politics 
of the regime or from the material benefits they might derive in becoming a ‘loyal’ 
opponent. More significantly however, co-optation is at times the direct outcome of 
divisions within the opposition itself (Cavatorta and Elananza, 2008). Opposition 
movements in the Arab world tend to subscribe to radically opposed ideologies and 
views of what policies the country should follow. These profound divisions 
undermine the unity of the opposition, which is a crucial asset if ruling elites are to be 
faced down convincingly. In the Arab world, the main dividing line over the last four 
decades has been the one between Islamists and secular-leftists and while there have 
been numerous examples of cross-ideological co-operation between these two sectors 
and a convergence towards a shared definition of democratic accountability 
(Abderahman, 2009: Clark, 2010), mutual suspicions still remain and make successful 
and lasting co-operation difficult. Thus, when co-operation occurred, this was often 
ad hoc and limited in time and space, failing to generate a sustained and effective 
coalition against authoritarian rulers (Cavatorta and Durac, 2010).  
 In Morocco this was also the case. During the 1990s and early 2000s political 
Islam and secular leftist groups found it extremely difficult to find common ground 
due to their profound ideological differences. However, the paper argues that, 
paradoxically, the rhetoric of democracy, accountability, human rights and 
development that the regime adopted so openly since the arrival of Mohammad VI in 
power has been instrumental in creating the possibility for both sectors of the 
opposition to move beyond ideology and confront each other on concrete political 
issues. This has led to two phenomena. On the one hand, sectors of political Islam 
entered a dialogue and cooperation with secular-leftists due to a convergence of 
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interests and opinions. On the other, there has been a deepening of already existing 
divisions within both the Islamist and secular/leftist camps, indicating that a neat 
separation between the two might not be a useful analytical tool to interpret 
opposition politics in Morocco, as it has become clear that the divisions are the 
product of the acceptance or refusal of the rules of the game dictated by the monarchy 
rather than ideological positions. This means that opposition politics and therefore the 
discourse linked to it are better understood by looking at whether Islamist or secular 
groups are included in the official and accepted political sphere or outside of it. In this 
respect the Moroccan regime might have adopted a strategy of ‘upgrading 
authoritarianism’ (Heydemann, 2007) that had had unintended consequences. By 
introducing a rhetoric and practice of globalisation that rested on the values of human 
rights, democracy and development in order to ‘divide and conquer’ the opposition, 
the Monarchy unwittingly opened the door to a re-composition of the political field 
where old divisions disappeared making a dialogue between Islamists and leftists 
possible. All the actors of Islamism seized on this opportunity to advance their causes 
and objectives, linking up at times with leftist elements and therefore re-shaping the 
way in which opposition politics works in Morocco.   
 
The Moroccan liberal space 
On October 1st 2010, the TelQuel media group formally announced at a press 
conference that the Arabic language weekly Nichane, which had become the best 
selling weekly magazine in the country, would cease its publication. Nichane was 
formally closed because it lacked the financial resources to continue operating, but in 
reality the magazine was a victim of a concerted campaign of financial boycott on the 
part of the states and business interests close to the regime, which refused to continue 
to place adverts in the publication. This occurred because Nichane had become too 
independent and critical of many of the policies that the government and the 
Monarchy were pursuing. As the press release of the TelQuel group indicates, ‘since 
2009, the determined struggle of the State against independent newspapers and 
magazines has accelerated significantly…the Moroccan authorities seem to be bent on 
following the Tunisian model [under Ben Ali], where only the newspapers that serve 
the interests of the regime are tolerated.’1 The closure of Nichane and the repression 
                                                 
1
 Groupe TelQuel, Communiqué de presse, Casablanca, October 1, 2010.  
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of independent journalism are simply one of the latest episodes in the authoritarian 
retrenchment that Morocco is experiencing since the middle of the 2000s. In many 
ways this is in sharp contradiction with the enthusiasm and genuine hope for political 
change that had greeted the arrival of Mohammed VI to power in 1999 and with the 
liberalising policies that he implemented, including ones that made Morocco a 
regional exception in terms of freedom of the press.  
During the first few years in power Mohammed VI showed with concrete 
actions and policies his intention to seemingly democratise the country and instil a 
‘human rights’ culture in state’s institutions. His father had understood in the early 
1990s that Morocco needed liberalising political reforms and he had begun to 
undertake some of them, including the creation of a Human Rights Ministry, but most 
Moroccans and many analysts simply believed these changes to be a façade and 
placed much greater hope in the son. They were not to be disappointed and, as one 
former political prisoner and human rights activist declared in 2005 ‘society is now 
allowed to breathe’ (Interview with author, 2005). The change in emphasis in favour 
of both democracy and human rights was not only rhetorical, as Mohammed VI took 
meaningful steps to support his declarations. He fired the powerful Minister of 
Interior Driss Basri, encouraged the creation of a reconciliation commission to 
investigate past abuses and passed legislation aimed at making it easier for civil 
society organisations to be set up and be involved in policy-making processes. The 
enthusiasm that these initiatives generated should not be underestimated and they 
gave a certain momentum to all those civil activists who had suffered during Hassan 
II’s repressive era, mobilising previously hidden and new energies within civil 
society. Thus, under Mohammed VI there has been what Howe (2005) termed ‘an 
explosion’ in civil society activism, including organisations promoting and defending 
human rights. Such organisations were involved in the setting up of the Instance 
Equité et Réconciliation (IER), which bought a significant amount of legitimacy to 
the King both domestically and internationally as did the 2004 reform of the family 
code. Such popular initiatives were coupled with the implementation of policies 
aimed at rendering the electoral process and the state’s institutions more democratic. 
The 2002 legislative elections were in this respect a turning point in Morocco, as they 
did not display the same level of ‘interference’ from the authorities as previous 
consultations did. In addition, there seemed to be the genuine intention to involve 
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Parliament more significantly in policy-making rather than relying exclusively on the 
executive, which is appointed by the King (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007).   
While a small number of activists always doubted Mohammad VI’s 
liberalising intentions, the majority of them bought into the vision that they were 
contributing to build democracy in Morocco in the context of a western-inspired 
globalisation structured precisely around the values of democracy and human rights. 
The rhetoric and actions emanating from the Palace seemed to substantiate the support 
that the King enjoyed in political circles previously hostile to the Monarchy because 
of its authoritarian rule. Thus, there was the legitimate expectation that the reforms 
would continue and that Mohammad VI would be the one enabling the Moroccan 
transition to democracy by gradually modifying the role of the Monarchy from an 
executive to a simply representative one. The turning point in the recent history of 
Morocco occurred in 2003 when on May 16, fourteen suicide bombers, belonging to a 
local radical Islamist group called al-Salafyia al-Jihadia, attacked targets in central 
Casablanca, signalling the end of the Moroccan exception. Until then, Moroccan 
ruling elites prided themselves of being exceptional within the Arab world in so far as 
the country was not concerned with terrorism, as neighbouring Algeria for instance. 
The attacks shattered the belief that Morocco was exceptional and immune to regional 
trends.  
The response of the regime was particularly strong and a new spiral of human 
rights abuses began, targeting sectors of political Islam. Initially, large sectors of the 
human rights community were not overly concerned with such abuses as other 
reforms beneficial to ‘human rights’ were being implemented, but the repressive turn 
has today extended from Islamists to other social actors such as Diplomés Chômeurs2 
or independent magazines and newspapers. In addition to this, no meaningful 
democratisation of the political system took place and, if anything, the Monarch has 
been able to reassert his central and undisputed authority on Moroccan politics, 
avoiding any constitutional reform that would limit his executive powers. The 2007 
legislative elections were far from being the historic event that the regime enthused 
about with foreign diplomats and ordinary Moroccans simply did not bother turning 
                                                 
2
 Diplomés Chômeurs literally means ‘Unemployed Graduates’ and is a collection of different groups 
of students with university degrees who are unable to find suitable employment despite their 
qualifications and organise protests against the government to highlight their plight and the poor 
economic policies adopted. Diplomés Chômeurs activities, such as marches or sit-ins, are very often 
broken up by the police with violence. For more on this issue see Badimon Emperador (2007).   
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out (Storm, 2008). Thus, after over ten years in power, it emerges that, according to 
numerous scholars and observers of Morocco, Mohammed VI’s reign has been largely 
disappointing in terms of democratisation and the promotion of human rights (Amar, 
2009; Vermeren, 2009). What is more worrying from a normative point of view is that 
the regime seems to have become more authoritarian and intolerant of dissent during 
the past few years, effectively ending any hope that Morocco would be the first 
country in the Arab world to move from authoritarianism towards democracy.  
The way in which King Mohammed VI handled the transfer of power from his 
father to him and the subsequent policies he adopted are now understood through the 
notion of ‘upgrading Arab authoritarianism’ (Heydemann, 2007). While there is 
probably some truth in this analysis, this should not overshadow two significant 
points. First of all, this reading is applied after the fact and this inevitably 
underestimates the way in which society was genuinely opened up by Mohammad VI 
(El-Ghissassi, 2006). The framework of upgraded authoritarianism is indeed a very 
useful one to account for the survival of Arab leaders in power, but it might wrongly 
assume that this strategy was intentional from the beginning and entirely successful. 
Secondly, today’s Morocco is not the Morocco of the ‘years of lead.’ This does not 
mean that it is not authoritarian and that there are no echoes of past practices as the 
disappearance of Salafist prisoners at the hands of the security forces demonstrates 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010), but there is nevertheless a liberal space that exists and 
within which a number of political movements and civil society actors operate.  
Democracy, human rights and economic development through integration with 
the global economy constituted the rhetorical framework that the Monarchy utilised to 
implement political, social and economic reforms since the late 1990s and this links 
Moroccan domestic developments to global trends. Even in these current times of 
authoritarian retrenchment the rhetoric of democracy and human rights has far from 
disappeared and in fact constitutes the point of reference of the Monarchy, which 
argues that repressive measures are necessary to protect the achievements of the past 
decade in the face of hostile and anti-democratic forces. As Mohammad VI pointed 
out in the speech which with he launched the IER, there is a connection between 
adhering to a human rights doctrine and fighting terrorism. He explicitly argued that 
‘this [was] the way to consolidate positive citizenship and to promote democracy, 
patriotism and the dissemination of a culture of human rights and duties. [These 
values] are the strongest ramparts to protect our society from extremism and 
 6 
terrorism, which We are determined to fight with the firmness required of those who 
are in charge of protecting the stability and security [of the country] in the context of 
the rule of law.’3    
This liberal environment, however limited it might be in reality, has mobilised 
the different ‘souls’ of Islamism, which have responded in different ways to the 
changes in the Kingdom and reacted differently to both the rhetoric and daily practice 
of democracy, human rights and economic development as conceived of by the 
Monarchy. Thus, this paper analyses the way in which these religious actors have 
dealt with the new political arrangements in place and how they have at times 
appropriated and at times fought against the rhetoric and the political values that 
globalisation has ‘brought’ to Morocco. 
 
Political Islam in Morocco 
Contrary to what scholars such as Munson (1991) argued in the early 1990s, 
Islamism in Morocco has become a political force to be reckoned with, indicating that 
the Kingdom, despite the religious legitimacy of the Monarchy, did not constitute an 
exception in the region. In a 2003 article reviewing the different expressions of 
political Islam in Morocco, Laskier argued that there were three clusters of Islamism 
in the country and to a certain extent his analysis is still valid today, although new 
Islamist actors have also appeared on the scene since then.  
First of all, there is a legally recognised political formation, the Party for 
Justice and Development (PJD), which is a socially conservative party integrated 
since 1996 into the political and institutional system devised by the Monarchy. The 
party is indeed allowed to participate to institutional politics precisely because it 
accepts the limits imposed by the Monarchy on the political game and therefore the 
PJD explicitly recognises the primacy of the Monarchy in the country’s institutional 
and constitutional set-up. The PJD, despite never having entered a government’s 
coalition, is deemed to be integrated into the liberalised autocratic system because of 
its unwillingness to criticise the monarch and bow to the Makhzen’s pressure when 
necessary. For instance, upon request by the authorities, the party decided not to run 
candidates in all constituencies at the 2002 legislative elections precisely to avoid 
                                                 
3
 Mohammad VI, Discours prononcé par SM le Roi à l’occasion de l’installation de l’Instance Equité 
et Réconciliation, January 7, 2004. Text available at http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/B272623A-
227C-46D3-AC67-557BE9DCDF7A  
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sweeping the board and embarrassing the King with a significant Islamist electoral 
victory (Willis, 2004). As recently as February 2011, the PJD refused to support the 
protest movements sweeping across Morocco precisely because they believe that 
constitutional reform should not be demanded in the streets but should be the product 
of parties’ lobbying. This attitude has triggered the resignation from the party of three 
prominent members supportive of the demonstrators.4 In short, the PJD is very much 
part of what can be labelled the ‘loyal opposition’ in so far as it remains deferent to 
the monarchy and to its executive primacy. The Monarch recently announced that 
there will be constitutional reforms and that the new provisions will limit the 
executive role of the King, although the repression of demonstrators continues.  
Second, there is the very popular semi-legal Justice and Charity Association 
(al-Adl) founded by the long time dissident Sheikh Abd al-Salam Yassine. This 
association operates like a social movement providing services and assistance to the 
poorer sections of society and is preoccupied with Islamising society from below by 
promoting a sort of Sufi-infused utopianism (Kristianasen, 2007). The social service it 
provides however have a considerable political dimension and the association also has 
a ‘cercle politique’ that functions like a political bureau. The cercle is charged with 
drawing up the political positions of the association on a number of national issues 
and has been consistently critical of the way Morocco is run and therefore directly 
critical of the Monarchy, whose legitimacy to rule it does not accept. This anti-
monarchical stance prevents the association from gaining not only the legal 
permission to operate social services, but, crucially, prevents them from becoming a 
political party. In fact, in order to be able to compete in elections the association 
would have to accept the limits, role and legitimacy of the Monarchy, which is a price 
that the association refuses to pay because it would then undermine their status as 
uncompromising opposition. Sheikh Yassine himself has been and still is a very 
outspoken critic of the Crown, which is blamed for not tackling the social and 
economic ills of Moroccan society (poverty, corruption of moral values, deference to 
the West, social atomisation). Islam is pointed out as the solution to all these 
difficulties and the social services, the cultural meetings and the political activities of 
the association are all infused with religious piety in order to demonstrate that there is 
                                                 
4
 For the details of the PJD’s position on recent demonstrations and internal repercussions, see the 
magazine Aujourd’hui le Maroc at www.aujourdhui.ma/instantanes-depeche81050.html Accessed on 
March, 10, 2011.    
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a concrete alternative not only to the way in which Moroccan society operates, but 
also a spiritual dimension with which governance should be infused. This does not 
make the association a naïve and purely spiritual group or a mad lunatic fringe as 
often depicted in pro-regime media. Over time its leaders have been capable to of 
demonstrating their political acumen on a number of issues by adopting very rational 
positions (Cavatorta, 2007). As prominent member Nadia Yassine argued ‘we have a 
cercle politique that draws up concrete policy proposals, [which means] that we are 
not only mad naysayers …we have concrete proposals [for the country]’ (Interview 
with author, 2008).  
The third Islamist camp is composed of two different Salafi tendencies. On the 
one hand there is the clandestine Salafist Jihad, a nebulous group devoted to 
overthrowing the government through violence. It is a minority strand and does not 
enjoy much popular support, but was responsible for the May 2003 Casablanca 
attacks. The movement Salafist Jihad has virtually disappeared due to the mass arrests 
that it experienced over the last few years. The security forces’ crackdown on Islamist 
terrorism and the marginalisation of Salafist Jihad by all other political groups 
combined to dismantle its network. Most of the militants are in jail and the only 
activities currently taking place connected with the movement are the ones that the 
association Ennasir holds in order to highlight the plight of the prisoners and their 
families. Most of these prisoners have been arrested and tried in very controversial 
circumstances and Ennasir attempts to highlight how the Salafi prisoners’ convictions 
have been unlawfully obtained by state, which employed kangaroo courts and torture. 
In addition, Ennasir struggles to defend the rights of the families of the prisoners as 
spouses and children suffer from harassment and discrimination on the part of the 
authorities in a number of realms ranging from the schooling of children to welfare 
benefits. The association Ennasir, founded in November 2004 with the objective of 
defending the prisoners’ rights and the rights of their families, is a self-defined human 
rights organisation. On the other hand, we have also the return on the scene of Dawa 
Salafism, which ‘concentrates on Islamising its followers and isolating them from the 
political process rather than directly challenging the state’ (Boubekeur, 2008). While 
this phenomenon seems to be growing considerably in Algeria, it does not seem to 
have become as popular yet in Morocco, although there is a history of it in the 
country. Today, the best know representative of this type of Islamism is theologian 
Sheikh Maghraoui, whose religious association promotes a very strict and literal 
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interpretation of Islam. The Sheikh has come under severe criticism in recent years for 
his position on the issue of under-age marriage and in a 2008 fatwa he stated that ‘the 
marriage of nine-year-old girls is not forbidden because according to the Hadith (the 
Prophet Mohammed's sayings), Mohammed married Aisha when she was only seven-
years-old and he consummated his union when she was nine.’5 These declarations 
have political undertones in so far as they seem to indicate that political and social 
relations should be based on immutable interpretations of sacred texts and sayings, 
but it they are strictly non-political in the sense that followers are encouraged to 
isolate themselves from official and institutional politics. In any case they have 
provoked a backlash against the association and the Sheikh with the authorities 
intervening to shut down some of their activities, although the Sheikh himself has a 
considerable power base in Marrakech and has been left alone by the authorities who 
have allowed him to leave for Saudi Arabia.6  
Finally, there exists a cluster of Islamism connected to and supportive of the 
Monarchy, which is often marginalised in studies of Moroccan politics, but that 
nevertheless is an important actor in the legitimisation of current political 
arrangements. There are for instance brotherhoods and associations such as the sufi 
Zaouiya Boutchichia, which has an important role in Morocco because it functions as 
the connection between sectors of the pious middle-class and the monarchy. The 
movement is very much aligned with the monarchy on political and social matters, 
which means that it can be mobilised to compete with opposition Islamism.  
Thus, the field of Islamism in Morocco is both varied and complex with 
competing trends and approaches to politics and social engagement, which depend on 
the religious beliefs held and on the political outlooks of leaders and members. Given 
the variegated field of Islamism in Morocco, the introduction of the values of 
mainstream globalisation incarnated by the notions of democracy, human rights, and 
economic liberal development has had a different impact on the actors of Islamism, 
which have taken these values and re-interpreted to suit their specific agenda. What is 
interesting to note is that in the process of engaging with such mainstream values, all 
these movements attempt to give them a ‘halal rubber stamp’ to make them 
compatible with their religious and political beliefs. This has led to different types of 
                                                 
5
 See statement at http://www.middle-east-online.com/ENGLISH/?id=27880 Accessed on October 22, 
2010. 
6
 More on Dawa Salafism in Morocco see http://www.lobservateur.info/Maroc/enfance-salafiste-les-
brigands-de-linnocence.php Accessed on March 11, 2011.  
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concrete relations with other actors on the political and social scene that do not 
subscribe to religious values as guides for policy-making and activism. In the next 
section we analyse these relations.  
 
Between religious ideology and pragmatism  
 Haynes (2010: 149) recently argued that ‘despite the undoubted impact of 
western-dominated globalisation…the impact on the MENA in terms of changing the 
context, terms of debate and preferences in favour of liberal-democracy is relatively 
limited.’ This argument carries a degree of validity in so far as the values of liberal-
democracy might not yet be as widespread as one would expect, but it is also 
important to note that not all the MENA countries are the same and in the case of 
Morocco, some religious actors have appropriated the discourse and practice of 
Western-dominated globalisation to turn it in fact to their advantage and at times 
against its very proponents both domestic and international. It is this discursive and 
practical appropriation that we investigate to illustrate how religious actors in 
Morocco operate.  
 There is little doubt that one of the core-values of liberal western-dominated 
globalisation is the respect of individual human rights. While in the past Islamist 
movements countered this discourse by rejecting the very notion of individual rights 
to focus on the notion of the common good which implied that some individual rights 
could be sacrificed to obtain it (Fuller, 2004) this is no longer the case today for some 
Islamist actors. The position of the association Ennasir linked to the Salafi Jihadi 
movement is for instance one group that would not normally be associated with the 
promotion and defense of individual rights. However, it is precisely this Islamist 
association that has for the past few years been at the forefront of the struggle for 
human rights in Morocco when it comes to the right to a fair trial, the right not to be 
discriminated because of specific political beliefs and the right of being treated 
respectfully while in custody. The struggle they conduct rests on a classic liberal 
interpretation of human rights and has benefited, paradoxically, from the rhetorical 
engagement of the Moroccan authorities on this very theme. The Monarchy and the 
Moroccan state have built its current reputation on the willingness to break with past 
abusive practices and the necessity to have proper rule of law and respect human 
rights. Despite, the authoritarian retrenchment in evidence since late 2003, the 
rhetoric, as mentioned earlier in the paper, has not changed. This stance exposes the 
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Moroccan authorities to the charge of hypocrisy given the way in which the rights of 
the members of Salafyyia Jihadia and the families of the members have been treated 
and the association Ennasir utilises the very same rhetoric to point at the 
inconsistency of the regime discourse. A further twist is that the response that the 
cause of Ennasir has elicited from other human rights associations and from fellow 
Islamists. This has meant that large scale human rights abuses committed against 
Islamists, however unpalatable their political views might be, did not find unanimous 
condemnation in traditional human rights circles. Quite the contrary in fact occurred, 
as Ennasir activists found that the doors to traditional left-wing dominated human 
rights groups were closed to them when they raised the issue of the Salafi prisoners. 
As Abderrahim Mouhtad, president of Ennasir, admitted, ‘before taking the decision 
of founding Ennasir, we knocked on all the doors of NGOs involved in human rights 
issues here in Morocco so that they might wish to take up the Salafi prisoners’ issue. 
Truly, I want to confirm that these NGOs did not want [to help] us’ (Interview with 
author, 2008). Islamists prisoners are no longer shy about telling their stories of abuse 
at the hands of the state publicly, as Storm (2009: 112) argues. She states that ‘radical 
Islamists often have unfair trials, and are ill-treated while in prison, something that is 
becoming increasingly apparent as more and more Islamists begin to tell their stories 
of torture and abuse, not only to their families, but now also to human-rights 
organizations and the media.’   
Thus, the decision of many human rights NGOs in Morocco not to defend the 
rights of the Salafi Jihadi prisoners occurred irrespective of the often private 
acknowledgment that many of the ones who had been unjustly arrested, tortured, tried 
and sentenced in unfair proceedings were not guilty of any violent act, but were being 
punished for their political ideas. For example the president of Forum Marocain 
Verité et Justice, an organisation that in the past had seen the coming together of both 
Islamist and leftist activists in defence of human rights , recently declared that ‘the 
[human rights] violations committed after 1999 are not as serious [as the ones 
committed before then]’ (Le Journal, January 2010). While this might be numerically 
correct in the sense that the Salafi prisoners who suffered and still suffer in jails are 
between 2,000 and 5,000, the scale should be irrelevant when it comes to abuses. 
However, this declaration sums up the view of many within secular civil society 
regarding the human rights regime that the Monarchy has put in place: human rights 
do not necessarily apply to problematic Islamists. There is however one important 
 12 
exception to this trend, the secular-leftist Association Marocaine des Droits Humains 
(AMDH) has from the beginning being very critical of the regime’s treatment of the 
Salafi prisoners and of the abuses to which they were subjected to. Such an 
engagement with this issue dates back to at least 2005 when members of the families 
of Islamist prisoners were allowed to tell their story during the AMDH series of open 
forums entitled ‘Temoignages en toute liberté pour la vérité.’7 As the president of 
association Khadija Ryadi declared ‘given that international conventions are our 
framework of reference [for our activism], our positions, discourse and demands are 
always in line with those conventions. This applies to every issue, be it the rights of 
women or the rights of Islamists. We defend everybody, all those who are victims of 
violence and abuse on the part of the regime’ (Interview with author, 2009). This is 
quite an important point because it indicates that one of the key values of liberal 
globalisation has become the glue of movements that are normally on opposing 
ideological sides. Naturally, it could be argued that the belief in a liberal notion of 
human rights on the part of Ennasir is simply instrumental, but while this might be the 
case, it should be disregarded as irrelevant because once a movement begins to 
express support for specific ideas it is then bound to them to certain extent 
(Schwedler, 2006). The position of Ennasir is striking also because the other Islamist 
groups, including the Party for Justice and Development and Yassine’s al-Adl 
movement, prefer to remain almost entirely silent on the issue of Salafi prisoners. 
Their virtual silence can be explained by the ideological and political threat that 
Salafism poses to both movements and by the fear of increased repression against 
them if they do get involved.  
The al-Adl, while critical of the monarchy, does not support the use of 
violence as a means to achieve political change in Morocco because this is not only 
religiously proscribed, but ultimately self-defeating politically as the masses have to 
be brought to be participants of change rather than simply having change imposed on 
them through a violent overthrow of the present regime (Nadia Yassine, interview 
with author, 2008). The PJD is integrated into the political system designed by the 
Monarch and it therefore has to tow the line on this very sensitive issue as well. Thus, 
the Casablanca bombings had the effect of crystallising a fragmentation of civil 
society that still today prevents the creation of a unanimous front on what human 
                                                 
7
 See www.amdh.org.ma/html/act_pub.asp   Accessed on March 11, 2011.   
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rights actually are and how they should be promoted or defended. The upshot is the 
absence of a serious challenge to the interpretation and implementation of human 
rights policies that the Makhzen has now the monopoly on. This particular 
relationship between movements of different ideological hues is not the only one that 
has drawn on the western-inspired globalisation surrounding the notion of human 
rights. The discursive and practical applications of the different religious groups 
regarding the nature of human rights run along multiple and variable lines. In this 
context it is worth examining for instance how socio-economic rights has entered the 
Moroccan political scene. In the face of the aggressive economic liberalisation that 
the Monarchy implemented over the course of the last decade to integrate the country 
into the global economy according to neo-liberal principles (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006) 
some religious actors have turned to the language of socio-economic rights to criticise 
such policies and the devastating social outcomes they have had. The position of the 
al-Adl is in this respect quite strong, as the association provides a thorough critique of 
the neo-liberalism and its effects in Morocco not by resorting to trite anti-imperialist 
sloganeering, but by focusing on the absence of respect of the most basic socio-
economic rights of ordinary Moroccans, which, according to the al-Adl undermines 
the quest for democracy. In this context, the dramatic socio-economic data ranging 
from youth unemployment to rates of literacy and from GDP per capita the number of 
Moroccans emigrating, that the cercle politique employs in its critique are not simply 
equated with failed economic policies, but, crucially, are seen as the concrete denials 
of democratic rights8. Thus, in many respects, socio-economic rights have primacy 
over political and civil ones because only when there is just economic development 
and a fairer distribution of resources there can be democracy. Globalisation is not 
identified as being negative per se because the negative effects it has are the product 
of the greed and mismanagement of the economic elites and the Monarchy. They are 
the ones who are held responsible for the poor state of the nation and the 2007 
document concludes that ‘it is the Makhzen that has become the real obstacle to 
democracy and development.’  
Accordingly, the al Adl is very engaged in supporting all forms of struggles 
that take place in Moroccan workplaces where workers strive for better pay and 
conditions and to end exploitation. It is therefore obvious that they support the current 
                                                 
8
 See the Lettre ouverte à toute conscience resposnable, publsihed in December 2007 by the cercle 
politique of the al-Adl. Available at www.hoggar.org  
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anti-regime demonstrations. This emphasis on socio-economic rights is in line with 
the thinking and the activities of some secular leftist groups and this has generated a 
degree of cooperation and coordination with them. The political formation with which 
the al-Adl is most closely cooperating with Annaji Addimouqrati (AD), a leftist group 
that is very engaged in alter-globalisation initiatives and in anti-regime political 
activities. This leftist group shares the same analysis of the ills of Morocco with the 
leadership of the al-Adl it is also considers the negation of socio-economic rights as 
the most significant obstacle to democracy because it conceives of democratic 
governance not merely as procedures and mechanisms of elections, but, crucially, as 
the necessary condition for the distribution of wealth. Thus, democracy has a 
considerable substantive dimension. At the operational level, this analytical 
coincidence with the al-Adl leads the two movements to support all sorts of 
demonstrations, strikes and struggles that have an economic dimension and are 
therefore active in providing material and political support to workers in different 
industries that strive to better their conditions, to the unemployed and to people living 
in slums who demand better living standards. One of the leaders of AD, Ali Afkir, 
pointed to a specific example of cooperation with the al-Adl: ‘[we both] support the 
struggle of factory workers in a factory for the treatment of phosphates to have their 
independent union recognised’ (Interview with author, 2010).  
There is also a political and institutional dimension to this cooperation 
between the two. At the ideological level, the AD is committed to a type of political 
pluralism that includes the right of all movements to be heard on the public stage, 
including the Islamists of the al-Adl, even if they ‘have profound disagreements with 
them on the issue of personal freedoms. Ali Afkir declared that ‘as long as the debate 
is conducted democratically and with respect, all have the right to express their 
political point of views’ (Interview with author, 2010). The same degree of tolerance 
of difference characterises the discourse of Omar Iharchane, member of the cercle 
politique of the al-Adl, who argued that ‘[the al-Adl] is ready to discuss with every 
other political force in Morocco. Obviously we are aware of the fact that some 
political movements perceive us badly and are afraid of us, but the fears are mutual 
and this is why debating with everyone is important’ (interview with author, 2010). 
The two movements have indeed taken their cooperation beyond declarations of 
mutual tolerance and beyond concrete support for workers into the institutional arena, 
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having run candidates on the same list for elections in the professional association of 
the engineers. 
At the institutional level, the regime has also made much of the notion of 
democracy and democratisation to frame the politics of Mohammad VI. On this issue 
as well, Islamists have applied different perspectives and subscribe to opposing 
readings. The PJD perceives itself as ‘building democracy’ through participation in 
institutional politics, running candidates for Parliament and attempting to influence 
policy-making from within the system. In this respect they cooperate with established 
political parties that have been loyal to the monarchy since their creation and behave 
as ‘responsible’ members of the establishment. Institutional participation in Morocco 
depends on the acceptance of the predominant role of the Monarchy and its legitimacy 
to shape policy and the PJD, as a religious party, accepts this because the monarch is 
legitimated to rule by the fact that he is the descendent of the Prophet. There is 
therefore a religious justification for their participation in addition to the practical one 
that they prefer to be inside institutions and trying to affect change rather than being 
outside and being unable to see any of their most preferred policies implemented. In 
this respect they behave much like the Socialist party (USFP), a one time foe of the 
Monarchy and now fully co-opted in the political system.  
Contrary to the PJD, the other clusters of Islamism refuse participation 
because they see it as selling-out to a monarch that has no intention of creating a 
genuine democracy where elected representatives rule and the King is simply a figure-
head. This is the position of the al-Adl for instance as well as Ennasir with both 
movements very critical of the notion of democracy used by the Monarchy and the 
parties involved in the political structures that the King has attempted to revitalise. In 
this respect a crucial demand of those outside the official political system is a 
thorough reform of the Constitution that would reduce or eliminate the executive 
powers of the Monarch. Even when the monarch announced in March 2011 that such 
reform would indeed take place, movements on the extra-parliamentary left and the 
al-Adl are critical and suspicious because they do not believe that the King will follow 
through as this is what the Monarchy has always done in the past at times of 
difficulty. The announcement is therefore interpreted as a tactic to buy time in the 
face of mounting social dissatisfaction. Criticising the Monarchy however is not what 
the PJD does. In fact the party prefers to see some of its policies implemented by 
relying on the Monarchy itself and therefore it ‘lobbies’ it on specific policies because 
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the party is aware that only the King can make things happen. While this strengthens 
the party due to the objectives it achieves, there is no doubt that such a strategy 
reinforces the authoritarian and arbitrary nature of monarchical rule, as the PJD 
competes with other parties for royal favours. As mentioned, it is not surprising that in 
the current revolutionary climate in North Africa, the PJD has steadily refused to 
encourage its members to participate to the demonstrations regularly taking place in 
Morocco since the early February 2011 while both the al-Adl and other leftist forces 
not represented in parliament support the demonstrations and have militants 
participating in them.      
  
Conclusion 
The complexity of political Islam in Morocco and the different ways in which 
it appropriates the language and values of globalisation introduced by the Monarchy 
to remake the legitimising foundations of its rule demonstrate that religious actors can 
and do adapt to new circumstances and are far from relying simply on anachronistic 
stances. A number of points emerge from this analysis. First of all, ‘religious’ 
ideology does not seem to be very important when it comes to interacting with 
movements of a secular persuasion. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Islamists 
movements, which should have core ideological points in common, find it easier to 
strike alliances with non-Islamist groups and associations. This indicates the 
significant tensions that exist within political Islam in Morocco, illustrating the 
impossibility of treating Islamism as a unified actor. This does not mean that religious 
precepts are irrelevant because Islamist movements in Morocco rely on different 
scholars and ideologues to justify their position and all of them have specific religious 
references (Zeghal, 2006) that are at times in sharp conflict with each other, but it is 
the political situation and the concrete objectives that movements wish to achieve that 
shape to a considerable extent the manner in which they operate. This leads to a 
second significant point. All Islamist movements seem to find credible and committed 
partners in secular movements to which, in theory, they should be distant from. In 
Morocco, this is not the case, confirming once again that other factors other than 
supposed ideological distance explain the nature of cross-ideological relationships. In 
Morocco, it is the relationship with the Monarchy that determines the relationship 
with other political and social movements. For Islamist movements, despite their 
rhetorical and at times concrete opposition to secularism in so far as it is believed to 
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destroy the fabric of society because of its perceived elimination of spirituality from 
social and political life, secular actors can constitute an important ally in a struggle for 
an enhanced role in Moroccan political life. Conversely, the traditional suspicions that 
many within the secular left have for Islamists are assuaged because there is a degree 
of convergence on shared objectives. Finally, the most interesting finding of this 
analysis is that the values of western-inspired globalisation such as human rights, 
democracy and development are being used and appropriated by a range of religious 
actors to advance their own understanding of it, which is at times in contradiction 
with their mainstream conceptualisation. This is an effective strategy to re-position 
themselves away from the label of ‘medieval’ and ‘un-modern’ political actors and it 
is a strategy that the Turkish AKP has successfully implemented (Dagi, 2009). The 
rhetoric emanating from Islamists movements in Morocco today is substantially 
different from the one they employed in the 1980s and 1990s when ‘Islam is the 
solution’ seemed a sufficiently clear slogan for supporters and enemies alike to 
identify the political positions of Islamist groups. While attachment to the notions of 
democracy and human rights might still be instrumental, the daily exchanges and 
relationships they have with secular counterparts suggest a rather radical re-think of 
Islamism on the part of its proponents, which have taken advantage of the limited 
liberal space in Morocco to offer alternative visions of society based on universal 
values.      
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